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SUBJECT: REGIONAL COMMAND EAST CIVILIAN UPLIFT: THE NEW, INTEGRATED
CIVILIAN-MILITARY PLATFORM

Classified by: CDDEA Ambassador E. Anthony Wayne; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: This is the first of a series of messages that will outline important innovations in our operational paradigm in Regional Command East (RC/E), one of the more volatile areas along Afghanistan's Pakistan border, to improve stability and demonstrate near and medium term progress. A key component of this new platform for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is the deployment now underway in RC(E) of significant numbers of civilian subject matter specialists from a range of USG agencies to work closely with military colleagues. We are seeking to build a population-centric COIN effort that conducts all operations by, with, and through Afghan institutions, both formal and informal. End Summary.

Unity of Effort

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¶2. (C) The first element of this effort deeply integrates military and interagency civilian personnel with senior leaders to execute a joint campaign plan -- on a division scale -- throughout the 14 provinces of RC(E). Authority and responsibility for executing this civilian-military plan, for "operationalizing" it, begins at the headquarters of Combined Joint Task Force-82 (CJTF-82) and is shared equally by the Commanding General and Senior Civilian Representative (SCR). This co-equal leadership structure focused on the defeat of the insurgency is replicated at the brigade and all lower unit levels wherever an interagency civilian team operates alongside its military counterparts.

¶3. (C) Jointly signed by the SCR and Commander of RC(E), the operational order for this campaign plan also focuses civ-mil operations into the district level. Interagency District Support Teams (DST) will operate from remote Combat Operating Posts (COP) throughout each province, extending the reach of established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) focused more on population centers. Manning these new interagency positions will be approximately 175 subject matter specialists as part of the civilian uplift supported by the extraordinary efforts of Washington and Embassy staffs.

Visitors welcome Innovations

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¶4. (C) During a recent visit to CJTF-82, CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus observed this paradigm at Baraki Barak, one of the focus districts selected under the joint campaign plan, commenting that this approach to counterinsurgency was particularly innovative. We have also described it recently to CODEL Burr (who also visited Torkham Gate and Jalalabad), the NATO Military Committee and NATO General Ramms (both of whom visited Panjshir), CODEL Bordallo (Task Force Cyclone), and State's Office of the Inspector General (travelling to Task Force Cyclone and Bagram-based PRTs). We are also familiarizing the 101st Division with this new counterinsurgency approach as it prepares to assume command of the regional battlespace from the 82nd Airborne Division.

Protect and Support the Populace and build Afghan Capacity

15. (C) The intent of this integrated civ-mil command, shared equally by the Commanding General CJTF-82 and the SCR, is to protect and support the populace by building the competence, capacity, and credibility of Afghan government (GIROA) and the Afghan National Security Forces through integrated operations at every level. The plan seeks to address the root causes of instability, enhance security and governance, and help set conditions for long term economic development. Nangarhar Province and the Kunar River Valley, including Laghman Province, known collectively as "NKL," are conflicted areas of concentrated insurgent activity, yet have the greatest potential for enduring stability and economic development. Thus, they are the focus for the main effort of the joint campaign plan being implemented by five regional interagency task forces, 14 PRTs, and nine DSTs. The principal USG agencies charged with this mandate include State, USAID, Agriculture, and DEA. Other agencies and their civilian personnel are playing important roles as well, including Defense, Justice, Treasury, and agricultural specialists from the National Guard Bureaus of several states.

Four Critical Operational Foci

16. (C) In addition to an agreed focus on NKL, the GIROA has also agreed to combined civ-mil operations across all lines of counterinsurgency operations -- information, governance, security, and development -- focused on the following three concepts:

-- District Delivery Pilot Districts. Four have been selected by the GIROA-led District Delivery Working Group in RC(E): Sarkani, Khogyani, Baraki Barak, and Sayadabad. (The two others are in RC(S).

-- Stabilization Areas. In those unstable areas of RC(E), the immediate goal remains to clear them of the enemy and malign influence, and to hold the areas. Setting the conditions to build going forward will require the combined effort of our interagency teams and GIROA.

-- Transfer of Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR). RC(E) is considering Bamyan, Panjshir, and Parwan Provinces, due to their relative stability, for the next phase of development effort whereby lead responsibility for each would transfer to GIROA.

An Abbreviated Case Study: Laghman Province

17. (C) Laghman Province is illustrative because the interagency PRT and National Guard agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) are fully integrated today. The challenges, as throughout the east and differing only by degree in many instances, remain: ineffective government, corruption, low literacy, high unemployment, no land dispute resolution mechanisms, and a virulent, complex insurgency. Over time, a "welfare state" mentality has evolved and now citizens and local officials rely on Coalition Forces, not the Afghan Government, for basic services and security. A nascent Provincial Development Council and proactive Governor in Laghman, however, are responding positively to a number of programs addressing these issues. Key is to engage the local populace by, with, and through GIROA civil and security officials; to empower community-based decision-making processes; and to link emerging Afghan leadership to relevant GIROA institutions in Kabul.

18. (U) An important albeit largely informal role in Afghan society, shuras are a means to draw in tribal elders, mullahs, maleks, key stakeholders, and even insurgent fence-sitters to mediate communal disputes, discuss and generate support for elections, address the concerns of the poor and women, and petition government. PRTs and DSTs have been using these gatherings to offer incentives for communities to join with sub-national authorities in security, governance and development compacts running the gamut of the many programs offered by the Afghan Government, international community, and the USG. Together with district-wide information campaigns, our immediate objective is to provide time and space -- stability -- to allow these relationships and programs to take hold and to set the conditions for more effective governance and economic development.

¶9. (C) Comment: Over the next several weeks, reporting from RC(E) will describe the rationale for selecting NKL and the operational foci described above in greater detail, as they will influence governmental legitimacy at the sub-national level where the insurgency is most active and the presence of effective civil service and Afghan institutions are so important. End Comment.

¶10. (U) This message was drafted by Regional Command - East.

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